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Abstract
We present a model of crime where two municipalities exist within a metropolitan statistical
area (MSA). Consistent with the literature, local law enforcement has a crime reduction eect
and a crime diversion eect. The former confers a spillover benet to the other municipality,
while the latter a spillover cost. If the net spillovers are positive (negative), then the respective
Nash enforcement levels are too low (high) from the perspective of the MSA. When we allow
for Tiebout type mobility, labor will move to the location oering lower disutility of crime (in-
cluding the tax burden). To attract labor, both jurisdictions would like to reduce crime in their
municipality. Interestingly, this could raise or reduce enforcement compared with the immobil-
ity case. If it was too high (low) under immobility, it will be raised (reduced) further under
mobility. In the symmetric case, neither can gain any labor, but the competition for it pushes
the jurisdictions further away from the ecient outcome. Thus, mobility is necessarily welfare
reducing. Next, we consider asymmetry in the context of dierences in eciency of enforcement.
The low cost municipality has the lower crime damage (inclusive of the tax burden) and attracts
labor. Mobility is necessarily welfare reducing for the high cost municipality and for the MSA,
but it has an ambiguous eect on the low cost municipality. Finally, we extend the model and
allow residents to choose between productive and criminal activities. We conclude that to the
extent that enforcement increases the number of criminals (\replacement eect"), jurisdictions
have an incentive to reduce their enforcement levels relative to the no-occupational choice case.
Additionally, the equilibrium levels of enforcement are more likely to be overprovided in the
presence of occupational choice.
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11 Introduction
Most of the literature in local public nance concludes that as intercity or interregional mobility of
goods, capital, and/or people increases, the level of local public goods tends to become ineciently
low. In this paper, we consider local crime enforcement and examine how dierent levels of house-
hold mobility aect the local provision of enforcement. Specically, we identify conditions under
which a shift from an economic environment characterized by household (or labor) immobility to
one with perfect mobility may lead to either under, over, or ecient provision of local crime en-
forcement. We also analyze how a higher degree of mobility aects the pattern of crime and crime
enforcement expenditures when jurisdictions dier in the cost of providing these activities.
Crime is a social ill that imposes substantial economic costs on society. Studies have shown, for
example, that crime tends to be associated with slower economic growth at both the national level
(Mehlum et al., 2005) and the local level, such as cities and metropolitan areas (Leichenko, 2001).
Evidence also suggests that crime has a signicant negative eect on property values (Naro et
al., 1980; Schwartz et al., 2003) and may be associated with increased residential segregation by
income and education, as households with high levels of income and education migrate away from
crime-ridden neighborhoods (Wilson, 1987; Cullen and Levitt, 1999). This process may exacerbate
matters by creating concentrations of poverty and unemployment, which fuel further increases in
crime as well as a host of other social pathologies (Case and Katz, 1991; Glaeser et al., 1996).
For these reasons, state and local governments devote substantial resources to crime prevention.
During the 2003-2004 scal year, for instance, local governments (e.g., cities, towns, counties) in
the United States spent more than $60 billion on police protection alone - nearly 5 percent of total
direct local government expenditures in that year.1
Public spending on crime prevention, however, tends to be highly uneven, even across mu-
nicipalities within the same metropolitan statistical area (MSA). Within the St. Louis MSA, for
example, the three most populous counties - St. Louis, St. Louis city, and St. Charles - tend to
allocate strikingly dierent amounts of resources to police protection. The largest county, St. Louis,
spent $136 per capita in 1997 on police protection. St. Louis city, which contains the historical
central business district, devoted nearly two and a half times this amount to law enforcement: $308
per capita. Spending in suburban St. Charles County, on the other hand, was much lower: $111
1These gures are derived from the American FactFinder at the U.S. Census Bureau.
2dollars per capita.2 To be sure, much of this pattern can be explained by the fact that crime rates
are signicantly higher in St. Louis city than either St. Louis county or St. Charles county.3
Nevertheless, dierences such as those described earlier require a more careful look at the
logic behind such spending. In particular, do local jurisdictions within metropolitan areas select
appropriate levels of public expenditure to ght crime? How does one jurisdiction's choice inuence
that of another? How does the mobility of a local population inuence the behavior of local
governments with respect to their spending decisions? We seek to explore these issues in this
paper.
There is a substantial literature on urban crime where the incentives of criminals and local
governments are explored. One of the earliest references to this issue is in Tiebout (1956, p. 423),
where he views policing in the context of a local public good and voting with one's feet:
`For example, those who argue for a metropolitan police force instead of local police
cannot prove their case on purely economic grounds. If one of the communities were to
receive less police protection after integration than it received before, integration could
be objected to as a violation of consumer's choice."
Tiebout's analysis abstracts from externalities (on other municipalities) that may be associated
with such local public goods. Recent contributions of Helsley and Strange (1999), Wheaton (2006),
and Pinto (2007), among others, show that externalities are inextricably linked to crime.4 Helsley
and Strange (1999) nd that if a community chooses a higher level of gating, it enjoys crime reduc-
tion but other communities suer from higher levels of crime (due to crime diversion). Wheaton
(2006) nds that unilateral increases in local law enforcement has the eect of \spatially displac-
ing" criminals along with reducing their active numbers through incarceration. Along similar lines,
2These gures are derived from the USA Counties data les at the U.S. Census Bureau.
3According to the FBI data reported in the USA Counties data les, the number of crimes per 100000 residents
in St. Louis city, St. Louis county, and St. Charles county in 1997 were, respectively, 13577, 4020, and 3154. The
spatial concentration of criminal activities has received some attention in the crime literature. For example, Burdett
et al. (2003) incorporates criminal activities into a search-theoretic model and shows that two neighborhoods, ex-
ante identical, can end up experiencing dierent levels of crime. Burdett et al. (2004) extends their previous model
by allowing for on-the-job search. Crime concentration arises in Verdier and Zenou (2004) as a result of locational
segregation and racial inequality. In our paper we approach this issue in a completely dierent way: we examine the
role played by labor mobility in shaping the spatial distribution of local crime enforcement activities and its impact
on the allocation of crime.
4Of course, such externalities can be pervasive in the case of local public goods. For example, Boarnet (1998)
considers infrastructure development at the county level. When a county spends on developing its infrastructure, it
attracts productive resources from neighboring counties. This leads to negative output spillovers.
3Pinto argues that enforcement spillovers may be either positive or negative depending on whether
the crime-reducing (deterrence) eects dominate the crime-diverting eects.
The focus of our paper is police enforcement, as opposed to private security measures discussed
in Hui-Wen and Png (1994). A recent paper by Lee and Pinto (2009) looks at private security
measures coexisting with publicly funded policing. The substitution between private and public
security measures raises the paradoxical possibility that a rise in policing by a municipality may
end up attracting crime rather than diverting it.
In the light of Tiebout (1956), one is tempted to ask how crime enforcement incentives may be
aected when residents vote with their feet by moving away from areas with relatively high net
crime damage (i.e., net of tax burden). To our knowledge, the existing literature has not directly
addressed this issue. This paper is an attempt to ll that gap.
We consider a framework where two neighboring jurisdictions face the same group of criminals
(see Wheaton, 2006, for example). If one municipality raises enforcement, the probability of crime
and the extent of crime damage are aected in the other municipality. These will, in general
aect the net marginal benet for that municipality, inducing an enforcement response. This
strategic interdependence is modeled assuming Nash behavior, where a jurisdiction chooses its
optimal enforcement level assuming the other jurisdiction's enforcement level to be given.
Under labor immobility, the Nash enforcement equilibrium that emerges is associated with two
types of spillovers. First, the increased enforcement will put some criminals behind bars and this
will potentially reduce crime in both jurisdictions. This confers a positive spillover that is not
internalized by the enforcing jurisdiction. Second, greater enforcement by a jurisdiction will divert
some criminals toward the neighboring jurisdiction, which is now a relatively soft target. This crime
diversion is a negative spillover. Equilibrium enforcement levels are too low (or too high) for the
metropolitan area as a whole, depending on the relative strengths of these two opposing spillovers.
When we allow for labor mobility, people will move into the jurisdiction that has the lower net
crime damage. If a jurisdiction wants to attract greater economic activity, it will try to attract
labor by lowering its relative net crime damage. If there is a net negative spillover of enforcement
by, say, jurisdiction A on jurisdiction B, this will create an incentive for A to raise its enforcement
further to increase B's relative crime damage. Starting from immobility, the incentive for A will be
to raise enforcement. Recall that if there is a net negative externality, A's enforcement was too high
4at the Nash (immobility) equilibrium. Mobility creates an incentive to raise it further, worsening
the distortion from the perspective of the metro area. In the symmetric case, both jurisdictions are
worse o. Thus, Tiebout type mobility worsens the existing market failure. This is interesting from
the perspective of Tiebout sorting, which suggests that choice of jurisdictions in which people can
locate may solve the market failure problem for local public goods. To be sure, we must note that
our ndings do not directly contradict Tiebout (1956), because he abstracted from externalities for
local public goods.5
The previous analysis does not include an \occupational-choice" between becoming a worker or
a criminal. It has been claimed in the literature that when the supply of criminals is endogenous,
higher levels of enforcement that lead to the interdiction of criminals may generate an even larger
pool of oenders. This eect is known as the \replacement" or \interdiction eect".6 In the paper,
we extend the model and examine the extent to which the presence of the \replacement eect"
aects the previous results.7
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 analyzes the strategic determination of
enforcement policies in the absence of labor mobility. This framework will serve as our benchmark
case. Section 3 introduces labor mobility and compares the Nash equilibria that emerge with and
without mobility. Section 4 analyzes the implications of asymmetry in enforcement costs between
jurisdictions. In Section 5, we extend the model and allow residents to choose between productive
and criminal activities. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model with Immobile Labor
Consider an economy with two jurisdictions, A and B, subject to criminal activities. Local govern-
ments decide in a decentralized way the level of law enforcement eorts in each region. We assume
in this section that residents are completely immobile.
Two things are common in the models of Wheaton (2006) and Pinto (2007), among others. First,
5There is some similarity between the externalities that we consider and the inter-jurisdictional spillovers analyzed
by Ogawa and Wildasin (2009), where they nd that decentralized policymaking can lead to ecient outcomes. Our
context is dierent, so their nding is not a generic feature of our model (in the present analysis enforcement levels
will be ecient only when opposing spillover eects balance each other out). Likewise, the paper diers substantially
from the kind of ecient outcome discussed in Oates and Schwab (1988) where environment is a local public good
(without inter-jurisdictional spillovers) and capital is mobile, while labor is not.
6See, for example, Sah (1991), Huang et al. (2004).
7We thank the Associate Editor and an anonymous referee for raising this point.
5a rise in enforcement by a jurisdiction reduces the overall number of active criminals in a metro area.
Second, it deects crime to other jurisdictions by making itself a harder target. There is a striking
similarity between these results and what is observed in the literature on transnational terrorism
(see Bandyopadhyay and Sandler, 2009, for example). Greater levels of defensive actions create
negative spillovers, by deecting terror to other potential target nations, while greater preemption
reduces global terror and confers positive spillovers. One way to model these spillovers is to adapt
an approach that was used in Dixit (1987). For simplicity, rst consider a given level of crime
(independent of aggregate enforcement) that can occur in the metro area. If jurisdiction A raises
enforcement, the crime shifts to B and vice versa. If A chooses the same amount of enforcement as
B, the crime is equally distributed. A simple way to capture the distribution of the allocation of
crime across is by using a probability function p(), where p is the probability of crime in A. Along








E2; E = eA + eB; (1)
where eA and eB are the enforcement levels chosen in A and B, respectively. Note that crime is
equally distributed when the two jurisdictions have the same enforcement levels. The signs of the
derivatives p1 and p2 indicate that when one area raises its enforcement level, the probability of
crime in the other area must rise. This captures crime diversion discussed in the literature.9
However, it is unrealistic to assume that a rise in enforcement will have no eect on aggregate
crime. In particular, the literature has consistently shown that aggregate crime falls with greater
enforcement (for instance, due to incarceration eects). We allow for this by introducing a reduced-
form metro area-wide crime damage function (with damage measured in units of the numeraire
8We follow the convention that for a function f(), fi() is the partial derivative with respect to its i-th argument.
Also, fij() is the partial derivative of fi() with respect to its j-th argument.
9The choice of this functional form is purely for tractability reasons. Note that, implicitly, this specication
assumes that law enforcement is essentially a local public good, i.e., everyone within a given jurisdiction enjoys the






eA=(LA) + eB=(LB) ;
where L
A and L
B are, respectively, the population or units of labor in regions A and B, and 0    1 is a parameter
that represents the degree of \publicness" of local law enforcement. For instance, if  = 0, crime prevention is a
public good, while if  = 1, it is a private good. It turns out that the choice of the functional form does not aect
the main conclusion of our paper, i.e., the idea that labor mobility decreases welfare. Since using the more general
specication makes the results unnecessarily complicated, we assume that  = 0.
6consumption good X):10
D = D(E); D0 < 0; and D00 > 0: (2)
The signs of the derivatives assume that as aggregate enforcement rises, MSA level crime damage
falls, although at a diminishing rate. Thus, expected total damage in A due to criminal activities
in that region is pD and expected total damage in B is (1   p)D. When eA increases, for a given
D, expected crime damage falls in A by Dp1 and increases in B by the same amount. This is pure
crime diversion and is a negative externality on B. However, D falls when aggregate enforcement
rises to the tune of D0. This benets A by pD0, and B by (1   p)D0. The latter eect is a positive
externality on B. Thus, local law enforcement causes a crime diversion eect (accompanied by a
negative externality) and a crime reduction eect (accompanied by a positive externality). The sum
of these two externalities is critical in determining the extent and direction of inecient enforcement
provision for the MSA. Let  LA denote the units of labor in jurisdiction A. Then, expected damage
per capita in A is (pD= LA).11
Production in region j region requires labor Lj and a region specic input, land, denoted Nj,
which for simplicity is normalized to one. The production function for X in A is
XA = F(LA;NA)  fA(LA); with fA0
(LA) > 0; and fA00
(LA) < 0; (3)
where LA is the labor used to produce X in A.12 Under labor immobility, LA =  LA. Let us assume
that enforcement is produced through a transformation technology eA = (XA
e =cA); cA > 0; where
XA
e is the amount of X that is needed to produce eA units of enforcement in A. A tax tj (in output
10Bandyopadhyay and Sandler (2009) use a similar terror damage function where preemption reduces the global
terror that can be produced by an international network of terrorists. Pinto (2007) assumes that the number of
potential criminals depends on the amount of law enforcement eorts exerted by local jurisdictions. In the present
model, this eect would be captured by the damage function.
11Essentially, this term attempts to describe in a simple way all the relevant features of criminal activities commonly
studied in the literature on urban crime. In the present analysis, the set of workers and the set of criminals are given.
In other words, we do not consider the \occupational choice" decision between becoming a worker in the formal sector
or a criminal. Several models that study the economics of crime incorporate occupational choice decisions (Burdett
et al. (2004), Huang et al. (2004), and Calv o-Armengol and Zenou (2004)), but they address dierent issues. Burdett
et al. (2004) and Huang et al. (2004) develop equilibrium search models of crime to study the connection between
crime and labor market opportunities. Calv o-Armengol and Zenou (2004) examine the role of social interactions and
criminal behavior in a game-theoretic framework.
12We assume in the spirit of the specic factors model in trade that F(L;N) exhibits constant returns to scale
(CRS) in the two inputs. Since the region specic input is xed (at unity), F(L;N) reduces to f(L), where the latter
has positive but diminishing marginal product of labor.
7units) on a unit of labor in j is used to nance enforcement activities.13 The regional government
budget constraint becomes:
cjej = tjLj; j = A;B: (4)
Using the CRS property of F() and the assumption of labor immobility, we can write regional
product of A as
WA(eA;eB) = wA LA + rA   cAeA   p(eA;eB)D(eA + eB)
= fA( LA)   cAeA   p(eA;eB)D(eA + eB): (5)
where wA is the factor reward for labor in A and rA is the return to the xed local factor of
production. The local authority in A maximizes WA by choosing eA under the Nash assumption
regarding eB. Maximizing WA is equivalent to minimizing
V A(eA;eB) = p(eA;eB)D(eA + eB) + cAeA: (6)
The rst-order condition of this minimization is14
V A
1 (eA;eB) = 0 ,  pD0   Dp1 = cA (7)
The rst term on the left-hand side (of the second equality) is the reduction in expected damage to
A, due to the crime reduction eect. The second term is the fall in expected crime due to the crime
diversion eect. At the margin, A sets eA to equalize the sum of these benets to the marginal cost
of enforcement. Equation (7) implicitly denes A's Nash reaction function:








13Since our focus is on labor (or household) mobility, we assume that the xed local input does not suer from
criminal activities and it is not subject to taxation. This assumption is important when labor is completely mobile,
which we consider in 3.





00 > 0, which is clearly
satised since D





(1   2p)(D0E   D)
E2 + pD00: (9)
Note that if V A
12  0, then deA=deB  0. Similarly, B's rst-order condition is
V B
2 (eA;eB) = 0 , (1   p)D0   Dp2 = cB ) eB = eB(eA): (10)
Expressions (7) and (10) jointly dene the enforcement Nash equilibrium.
At a symmetric equilibrium (i.e., p = 1=2), (9) reduces to
V A
12(eA;eB) = pD00 > 0: (11)
Expressions (8), (10), and (11) imply that, at a symmetric equilibrium, the Nash reaction functions
of A and B are negatively sloped. In other words, enforcement levels are strategic substitutes
for each other. Figure 1 presents this case. This is interesting in the context of Proposition 2 of
Helsley and Strange (1999), who nd that gating expenditures are strategic substitutes whenever
the marginal aggregate cost of crime (in a community) is decreasing. Their intuition is the following:
as gating by community j rises, it will shift criminals to community i. Diminishing marginal cost
of crime will reduce the marginal benet from gating for i, leading to lower gating by i as a Nash
response.
The mechanism behind our nding is the following: a rise in eB raises aggregate enforcement E
(given eA). When D00 > 0, the aggregate marginal benet for raising enforcement (i.e.,  D0) falls
with E. For a given p, this reduces the marginal expected benet (i.e.,  pD0) for A. Expressions
(9) and (11) show that this is the only eect that matters in a symmetric equilibrium, and thus
enforcement levels are strategic substitutes. Although there are analytical similarities, the reason
for strategic substitutability here is distinct from Helsley and Strange (1999), where the decreasing
marginal cost of crime was the driving force behind strategic substitutability. In our context, it is
the decreasing marginal eectiveness of aggregate enforcement that renders A's enforcement less
eective (when B raises its enforcement) and contributes to its reduction.
9Let us now consider the cooperative (MSA level) outcome:
WC(eA;eB) = WA + WB
= fA( LA) + fB( LB)   V A(eA;eB)   V B(eA;eB): (12)





NE =  V B
1 (); where ;V B
1 =  Dp1 + (1   p)D0: (13)
The second equality in (13) suggests that V B
1 () can be of either sign, depending on the relative
strengths of the positive externality (1 p)D0, and the negative externality  Dp1 on B created by
a marginal increase in enforcement by A. Using (7), (13) can be reduced to
V B




NE < 0; if and only if jD0j < cA: (14)
Thus, for the MSA, evaluated at the Nash equilibrium a rise in eA reduces eciency (in other
words, eA is excessively high at the Nash equilibrium) if the marginal fall in crime damage is lower
than the marginal cost of eA.
Proposition 1. The Nash enforcement levels in a symmetric equilibrium are equal to, greater than,
or less than the ecient levels, depending on whether the marginal cost (i.e., cA = cB = c) is equal
to, greater than, or less than the marginal value of the MSA-wide crime damage function.
The proof is in the preceding derivations. A marginal rise in enforcement by a jurisdiction creates
both a positive and a negative spillover on the other. The former is due to a reduction of crime at
the MSA level (as more criminals are removed from action), which benets both jurisdictions; the
latter is due to the shifting of crime to the other jurisdiction. These exactly oset each other when
the marginal cost of enforcement equals the MSA-wide marginal crime reduction. Otherwise, the
Nash equilibrium is inecient. If marginal cost exceeds (is lower than) the crime reduction, the
negative (positive) spillover dominates and we have overprovision (underprovision) of enforcement.
103 Enforcement under Mobile Labor
This section allows for Tiebout type labor mobility, where people move between A and B so as to
equate the real income of a labor unit between the two potential locations.15 Factor rewards in the
locations are
wj = fj0
(Lj); and rj = fj(Lj)   wjLj; where j = A;B: (15)
As in the previous case, we assume that local law enforcement activities in region j are nanced
with a tax on labor in that region, i.e.,
tj =
cjej
Lj ; j = A;B: (16)
Expected net-of-tax real income of a unit of labor is given by16
uA = wA   tA  
pD
LA; and uB = wB   tB  
(1   p)D
LB : (17)
Using (6), (15), (16), and (17), equilibrium migration implies








LA + LB =  LA +  LB =  L: (19)
Using (18) and (19) we obtain the equilibrium allocation of labor across jurisdictions LA =
LA(eA;eB); and LB =  L LA(eA;eB) = LB(eA;eB): When the levels of local enforcement change,
15The context here is enforcement competition in the presence of Tiebout type mobility. A good parallel is the
work of Brueckner (2000), where Tiebout sorting is analyzed in the presence of tax competition. Unlike that paper we
do not consider preference heterogeneity. The Tiebout element comes in through ex ante identical consumers voting
with their feet to choose the location that is just right for them. In equilibrium this leads to ex post equalization of
their utilities from the two potential locations.
16Assuming that criminal activities are exclusively targeted to residents or labor, the expressions in (17) can be
justied as follows. Each unit of labor in A earns w
A and pays t
A. A representative resident of that jurisdiction is
victimized with probability p, suering a loss equivalent to D=L









A. A similar reasoning applies to region B.

























(LB)2 < 0: (20)
Consider the no-mobility case examined in the previous section. At that Nash equilibrium,
the levels of eA and eB are such that V A
1 = V B
2 = 0. Therefore, evaluated at the no-mobility













2 g = signfV A
2 g: (21)
Next, we examine how the patterns of crime and crime enforcement change when residents become
completely mobile, considering the no-mobility case as the starting point. Proposition 2 below
addresses this issue. The rest of this section assumes symmetry, but we relax this assumption in
section 4.
Proposition 2. Unless the initial Nash equilibrium is ecient (i.e., V B
1 = V A
2 = 0), labor mobil-
ity raises (reduces) Nash enforcement levels compared with the immobility case when the net crime
externality on the other municipality (V B
1 for locality A) is positive (negative) and necessarily aggra-
vates the pre-existing market failure problems arising due to the presence of net crime externalities.
Welfare of both municipalities is lower under free mobility of labor.
Proof. Consider the following three cases:
Case 1: V B
1 > 0. When V B
1 > 0, the diversion eect dominates the incarceration eect. Notice
from (13) that in this case the Nash enforcement levels are too high. Additionally, in this case
17We assume that the equilibrium level of L
A is (dynamically) stable implying that H < 0. Suppose that L
A
increases gradually as the dierence between u
A and u
B gets larger. Specically, let u = u
A u
B and _ LA = h(u);
where _ LA  dL
A=dt and h
0() > 0: In equilibrium, _ LA = 0. Then, the equilibrium value of L
A is dynamically stable
if (at the equilibrium) dh(u)=dL
A < 0; or if h
0()[d(u)=dL
A] < 0: Since h














Hence, we assume that the production functions in A and B are suciently concave at the migration equilibrium,
such that (20) is satised. In general, this restricts the parameter space (the parameters that dene the functional
forms of the production and damage functions) where a sensible migration equilibrium occurs.
12V A
2 > 0 and, therefore, LA
1 > 0 and LB
2 > 0. Using (5) and (18) we may represent the regional
income function for A in the mobility case as:18
WA(eA;eB) = fA[LA(eA;eB)]   V A(eA;eB): (22)
The Nash rst-order condition for A is
WA
1 (eA;eB) = fA0
()LA
1 ()   V A
1 () = 0: (23)





no mob NE = fA0
()LA
1 () > 0: (24)
By raising enforcement, A shifts some crime to B. This makes some labor relocate to A raising its
welfare (given B's enforcement). Both jurisdictions face similar incentives to raise their enforcement
levels. Note that there cannot be eciency gains in the production side, because the nal symmetric
equilibrium splits the labor force evenly as in the no-mobility case. The end result is that the
jurisdictions engage in wasteful competition for labor, and raise their enforcement levels higher
than the already excessive levels that existed in the no-mobility Nash equilibrium.
Case 2: V B
1 = 0. From (20) we nd that in this case LA
1 = 0. Thus, there is no incentive for A (or
B) to alter their enforcement levels due to mobility. From proposition 1 we know that under this
condition the Nash equilibrium is ecient. Since there is no incentive in this case to depart from
that equilibrium, the mobility and immobility equilibria converge and they are both ecient.
Case 3: V B
1 < 0. In this case, LA
1 < 0 and so is LB
2 . Notice from (13) that in case 3, enforcement is
too low compared with the ecient level (i.e., the diversion eect is dominated by the incarceration
eect). Following the logic of (23), we nd that there is now an incentive for both jurisdictions
18As it is well recognized in the immigration literature, labor mobility leads to welfare calculations that are some-
what controversial. Our utilitarian representation implies that the output of the municipality net of crime related
costs (expected damage and enforcement costs) is the measure of local welfare. In that case, as long as marginal
product is positive, a municipality will want to add more labor because that will raise local output. However, be-
cause of diminishing returns in production, the wages of existing residents fall. In this case, in an ex ante sense, the
objectives of the existing residents and that of the municipality (which counts the income of the potential entrant
as well) seem to be at odds. The qualitative nature of the analysis that follows is unaltered if instead we were to
assume a somewhat more general representation for the local welfare function, where the only requirement is that
local welfare is a positive function of the size of its labor force. If not, the analysis is not changed, but the welfare
results will be reversed.
13to reduce enforcement to attract labor. Labor mobility exacerbates the problem by inducing local
governments to reduce enforcement further away from the ecient level. The jurisdictions end up
with lower welfare under mobility compared with the no-mobility case. As far as we are aware, this
eciency-reducing eect of Tiebout type mobility has not been noted in the literature on crime and
enforcement. There are elements of the tax competition literature here (see, for example, Wildasin,
1986, or Wilson, 1999). However, our results are distinct because the market failure in our context
is primarily driven by crime externalities. Factor mobility compounds that distortion. It is only
this latter eect that is related to the tax competition results.
Thus, unless the initial levels of eA and eB are ecient, a higher level of labor mobility will tend
to aggravate the under- or over-provision problem commonly observed when decisions are made by
local governments in a context of inter-jurisdictional externalities.
4 Implications of Asymmetry
There are at least two potential sources of asymmetry in this context: asymmetry in production
functions and in enforcement technologies. We concentrate on the latter because the focus here is
on crime and enforcement and not on relative production eciency. Also, it is probably reasonable
to assume that production technology will not dier greatly between neighboring jurisdictions. On
the other hand, eciency of enforcement is a central issue in the literature. For example, Wheaton
(2006) proposes that it is the eciency of enforcement of smaller jurisdictions that may explain his
paradoxical empirical nding that lower enforcement may be associated with lower crime.
We adapt a technique from Bergstrom and Varian (1985) to consider implications of cost asym-
metry where the aggregate level of the cost is constant. This is achieved when we consider a mean
preserving spread of the marginal costs of enforcement of A and B (cA;cB; respectively).19 Assume
that
cA =  c   "; and cB =  c + "; " > 0: (25)
From (25) we can see that as " rises, the jurisdictions become more asymmetric, while the average
19As we will see below, this approach lends analytical tractability. In addition, it has the virtue of comparing
jurisdictions on the basis of relative eciency, because the average eciency of the MSA is held constant.
14eciency (i.e., (cA+cB)=2 =  c) for the MSA is unchanged. Let us now sum the rst-order conditions
(7) and (10):
D0 + D(p1   p2) + cA + cB = 0: (26)




=  2 c ) E = E( c) =  E: (27)
(27) implies that the aggregate level of enforcement E and hence, the function D, are not aected
by ". Recognizing this, total dierentiation of (7) yields













A rise in " will raise A's equilibrium enforcement level exactly to the tune of its reduction for B
because the aggregate level E is unchanged. Using (14) and (25),
V B
1 () = D0 + cA = D0 +  c   ": (29)
Similarly,
V A
2 () = D0 + cB = D0 +  c + " ) V A
2 () > V B
1 (): (30)
The crime-increasing eect on A of a rise in enforcement by B exceeds the corresponding spillover
eect for a rise in A's enforcement. Of course, as cost asymmetry rises, it aects relative crime
damage and causes labor migration. To see this, consider the eect of asymmetry on V A and V B,
respectively. Noting that deA =  deA and also that dcA =  dcB =  ", we can totally dierentiate
the expressions for V A and V B to obtain (for the no-mobility case)
dV A
d"
=  (D0 + cB)
deA
d"







=  (D0 + cA)
deB
d"





15Proposition 3. In the asymmetric Nash enforcement equilibrium: (i) The low-cost municipality
provides more enforcement; (ii) The expected damage from crime (including enforcement costs
nanced by taxation) is lower in that municipality and it attracts labor; (iii) If marginal products
are equal at the pre-migration equilibrium, allocative eciency is not aected (for small changes);
(iv) Enforcement competition to attract labor leads to further losses by aggravating the pre-existing
market failure problems; (v) The high-cost municipality must lose, the low-cost municipality may
or may not gain, and joint welfare must necessarily fall.
Proof. We proceed by considering the three cases analyzed in the previous section.
Case 1: V B
1 > 0. In view of (30), V A
2 must be positive as well. In turn, using (21), we infer
that LA
1 > 0 and LB
2 > 0. Thus the analysis of this case is analogous to that in section 3. Both
jurisdictions face similar incentives and raise their enforcement levels. Using (28) and (31) we can
infer that at the asymmetric no-mobility equilibrium, V A is lower than V B (note that in case 1:
(dV A=d") < 0;(dV B=d") > 0). Using (18), this will suggest, ceteris paribus, that labor will want to
move to A to avoid the higher expected disutility from crime (and tax payments) in B. The eect
of mobility on the jurisdiction's welfare (evaluated at the asymmetric no-mobility equilibrium, but
assuming that initially population or labor is identical in both regions so that fA0 = fB0) may be
analyzed as
dWA = fA0
()dLA   V A
2 deB;
dWB = fB0
()dLB   V B
1 deA =  fB0
()dLA   V B
1 deA;
dWA + dWB =  V B
1 deA   V A
2 deB: (32)
From (32) it is clear that to the extent that mobility will raise LA as well as enforcement levels
in both jurisdictions, A's welfare may or may not rise. However, B's and the MSA's welfare must
unambiguously fall.
Case 2: V B
1 = 0. In this case, LA
1 = 0 and A's enforcement level is not aected by mobility.
However, V A
2 is positive, implying that LB
2 > 0. Thus, B has an incentive to raise enforcement.
From (32), note that the welfare eects of a change in eA are weighted by V B
1 and, therefore, vanish.
Because V A
2 is positive and eB rises, welfare in B and MSA level welfare must fall. Welfare in A
may rise if the labor enhancement suciently raises output in that location.
16Case 3: V B
1 < 0. Here LA
1 < 0, thus A has an incentive to lower enforcement to attract labor.
Thus, V B
1 deA > 0. It is possible for V A
2 to assume either sign or be zero. If V A
2 > 0, B raises
enforcement to attract labor. Thus, V A
2 deB > 0. Using (32), this implies that joint welfare must
fall. If V A
2 < 0, then from (21), LB
2 < 0, and B will reduce enforcement to attract labor. Again,
V B
2 deB > 0. Thus, regardless of the sign of V A
2 (including zero, in which case V A
2 deB = 0), we may
infer (from (32)) that joint welfare must fall.
Finally, let us consider the MSA level welfare in a somewhat dierent way:
WC(eA;eB) = WA + WB
= fA(LA) + fB(LB)   D(eA;eB)   cAeA   cBeB: (33)
In the no-mobility case,
WC
1 () =  (D0 + cA) =  V B
1 ; and WC
2 () =  (D0 + cB) =  V A
2 : (34)
Given (30), this implies that WC
2 () < WC
1 (). In the absence of a corner solution (i.e., eB = 0),
enforcement in both jurisdictions cannot be eciently chosen. Thus, case 2 of section 3 where the
Nash interior outcome is also ecient must disappear, with at least one of the two jurisdictions
choosing too much or too little enforcement. Indeed, because V A
2 > V B
1 ; V A
2 (and, hence LB
2 )
is positive for a larger range of parameters compared with V B
1 (and hence LA
1 ), where B has an
incentive to raise enforcement. This is bad from an eciency perspective, because B is the relatively
high-cost provider of enforcement.
5 Occupational Choice and the Replacement Eect
The analysis thus far does not include an \occupational choice" between becoming a worker or
a criminal. If the supply of labor (or criminals) depends on the level of crime enforcement, then
additional eects come into play. An eect that has received some attention in the literature on
crime is known as the \replacement" or \interdiction eect" (Sah (1991), and Huang et al. (2004)).
The idea is that higher spending on crime enforcement that leads to the interdiction of criminals
may generate an even larger pool of oenders. Since incarceration reduces the number of eective
17criminals, then, at the margin, the expected payo of crime rises inducing some individuals to switch
from productive to illegal activities. In other words, the \vacancies" produced by the removal of
criminals from the market of oenders are lled up by new criminals. The counterpart is a decline
in the supply of productive workers. In this section, we assume that residents can choose between
productive and criminal activities, and examine the extent to which it aects the previous results.
Let the damage function D in equation (2) depend on the number of active criminals m in
the entire metro-area, so that D  (m); with 0 > 0; and 00 < 0: Suppose that there is a stock
of preexisting criminals  m, who are not employable in the productive sector. Enforcement levels,
chosen in stage one, lead to the incarceration of some members of this preexisting stock. The
number of criminals incarcerated is
  (eA + eB)  (E); 0 > 0; and 00 < 0: (35)
After observing the levels of crime prevention, individuals residing in each location choose between
working in the productive sector or being a criminal in stage two. Let j denote the number of
residents in jurisdiction j = A;B, who choose to become criminals. Then, m   m (E)+A+B.
Substituting into the damage function gives
D  D(E;A;B)  [ m   (E) + A + B]: (36)
Equations (36) and (2) are identical when A = B = 0.20 The analysis below considers the case
where productive labor is immobile between jurisdictions.21 We assume that a productive labor
unit in j earns the local legal wage, pays taxes, and may be a victim of crime as in the earlier
section. Also, when a resident of jurisdiction j becomes a criminal, she simply earns the metro-
wide reward for the active (i.e., non-incarcerated) criminal D=m. Therefore, occupational choice is
20Note that DE =  
0




00 > 0, consistent with (2).
21It can be shown that the governments' optimization problems in the mobility case are the same as that in the
immobility case analyzed in this section. This happens because net utility of productive labor is equalized between
jurisdictions even under immobility in this context, because it must equal the common metro-wide return to criminal
activity. A formal proof is in an Appendix available upon request. If there is a disutility from being a criminal (as in
Verdier and Zenou (2004), or Conley and Wang (2006), for example), and if that disutility is suciently high, then
we revert to the analysis of the previous sections. The reality perhaps lies somewhere in between, and an analysis
that allows for such disutility, and heterogeneity in moral aversion to criminal income will throw more light on the
issue.
18guided by the following conditions:












where Lj =  Lj   j, wj = fj0(Lj); and tj = cjej=Lj. Equations (37) implicitly dene A 
A(eA;eB) and B  B(eA;eB). The eects of eA and eB on A and B are, in general, ambiguous.
The ambiguity arises because local enforcement aects the relative payos of criminal activities in
opposite directions. First, the return of local productive activities change because enforcement
aects taxes paid by labor and expected damage in the jurisdiction. Second, it raises the per-
capita booty for criminals. Finally, it has an eect on the incentives of becoming a criminal in
the other jurisdiction, which ultimately inuences the local relative payos. Thus, a priori, it is
not clear which eect will dominate.22 In general, when 
j
i (j = A;B;i = eA;eB) is positive, new
criminals shift from the productive labor pool, replenishing the depleted stock of criminals.
In a decentralized equilibrium, government A chooses the level of eA that maximizes WA(eA;eB) =





1   p1 + p00   cA = 0: (38)
Evaluating (38) at the no occupational choice (i.e., 
j
i = 0) equilibrium gives  p1+p00 cA = 0:





no OC =  (fA0
+ p0)A
1   p0B
1 < 0; if 
j
i > 0: (39)
Expression (39) indicates that when an increase in eA induces individuals to shift from productive
to criminal activities in either A or B (replacement eect), the government in A has an incentive
to scale back its equilibrium enforcement level. Similar analysis applies to B.








22The mathematical details are spelled out in an Appendix that is available upon request. Note that in our model
the \replacement eect" takes place partly because @(D=m)=@E = (
0=m)[(=m) 
0] > 0, since 
0 > 0 and 
00 < 0.












1   (1   p)0(A
1 + B
1 ) + (1   p)00 + p1: (40)
Considering the damage function dened in (36), it is evident that the last two terms of (40) capture
the same external eects of eA on jurisdiction B described by expression (13), i.e., without occu-
pational choice. When the replacement eects A
1 and B
1 are positive, two additional externalities
arise. First, as individuals shift from productive to criminal activities in B, production declines
in that jurisdiction (this eect is represented by the rst term of (40)). And second, as the total
number of criminals increase due to the replacement eect, the damage in B becomes even larger
















1 ) + 00 < cA: (41)
Condition (41) is similar to (14), except that it includes additional terms arising out of the replace-
ment eects in jurisdictions A and B.
Proposition 4. When the replacement eect is positive, i.e., 
j
i > 0;j = A;B;i = 1;2, each
jurisdiction has an incentive to scale back its enforcement compared to the no-occupational choice
case. In addition, in the presence of occupational choice the Nash enforcement levels are more likely
to exceed the ecient levels (compared to the Nash equilibrium enforcement levels determined in
Section 2).
The rst part of the proposition follows immediately from (39). For the proof of the second part,
consider expression (41). It is clear that when A
1 > 0 and B
1 > 0, the inequality is more likely to
be satised. This is because as some workers become criminals, there is loss in production in both
jurisdictions represented by fj0
j
i, and an increase in crime given by 0(A
1 + B
1 ). In turn, this
means that in the presence of occupational choice, enforcement is more likely to be over-provided.
6 Concluding Remarks
In a framework with multiple jurisdictions where crime enforcement policies are interdependent,
unilaterally optimal policies for a jurisdiction may not be optimal for the MSA. The paper outlines
20the conditions under which local governments may end up over-providing or under-providing en-
forcement compared with the ecient level. The main nding of the paper is that the introduction
of Tiebout-type labor mobility necessarily worsens the outcome from an eciency point of view.
Under symmetry, the only eect of mobility is to encourage wasteful enforcement competition (for
labor) between jurisdictions.
The paper also examines the extent to which asymmetry aects the previous conclusions. Specif-
ically, under asymmetry in enforcement costs, wasteful enforcement competition further aggravates
the distortions. However, in this context it is possible for the low-cost jurisdiction to improve its
welfare at the cost of the other jurisdiction and the MSA as a whole.
Finally, the model is extended to include an occupational choice between becoming a worker
or a criminal. It is shown that when enforcement increases the number of criminals (due to the
\replacement eect"), jurisdictions have an incentive to reduce their enforcement levels relative to
the no-occupational choice case. Additionally, the equilibrium levels of enforcement are more likely
to exceed the ecient levels in the presence of occupational choice.
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APPENDIX NOT FOR PPUBLICATION
A Appendix
A.1 Occupational Choice and Labor Immobility: Comparative Statics






























 m   (E) + A + B = 0: (A.1)
Complete dierentiation of (A.1) with respect to e
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H = FAGB   FBGA: (A.8)
The solution is \stable" if FA +GB > 0 and H > 0. Since our focus is on a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., FA = GB
and FB = GA, then the previous conditions also imply that FA = GB > 0.
It is clear from (A.2) and (A.3) that the impact of e
A on 
A and 
B is, in general, ambiguous. However, under
certain conditions, 
A
1 > and 
B
1 > 0 are plausible. In other words, the \replacement eect" may be observed in




1 . Note that while
the rst term in FeA describes the change in the utility of labor when e
A increases, the second term captures the
corresponding change in the reward per criminal. Thus, when FeA > 0 (FeA < 0), e
A tends to increase (decrease) the
relative payo of labor. Similarly, GeA describes the change in relative payos in jurisdiction B due to an increase in
e
A.
Consider the impact of e
A on 
A. Two eects take place in equilibrium. First, if FeA < 0, then a higher e
A
increases the relative payos of criminal activities in A, and consequently, 
A tends to rise. This eect is captured
23Similar results hold for e
B.
1by the term  GBFeA in (A:2), which represents the direct impact of e
A in jurisdiction A. Second, an increase in
e
A also aects the incentives to become a criminal in jurisdiction B. When GeA < 0, the relative payos of criminal
activities increase in that jurisdiction. To the extent that residents in B are induced to join the pool of criminals m,
it will aect the relative payos in jurisdiction A, and, consequently, 
A. This eect is captured by the term FBGeA
in (A:2). If FB < 0, as residents in B decide to become criminals, it will tend to increase the incentive of residents
in A to become criminals. A similar reasoning can be used to explain 
B
1 > 0.
A.2 Occupational Choice and Labor Mobility
When residents in A and B can choose between productive and criminal activities, and if, in addition, labor is mobile,



























 L +  = L
A + L
B; (A.11)
where  = 
A + 
B and m =  m   (E) + 
A + 
B. Since labor is mobile across jurisdictions, the net return to
productive activities should be the same in A and B, as indicated by (A.9). Additionally, in a model with occupational
choice, the net return to labor in each jurisdiction must be equal to the return to criminal activities. This condition is
represented by expression (A.10). Finally, (A.11) establishes the resource constraint. The system of equations (A.9)
- (A.11) jointly determine fL
A;L
B;g.
Next, we compare the solutions determined by the system of equations (37), when labor is immobile, to the cor-
responding solutions of the labor mobility case, determined by equations (A.9)-(A.11). Consider a solution f
A;
Bg
of (37), or alternatively, L
A =  L
A   
A and L
B =  L
B   
B. Then, the latter will also be a solution of the system
of equations (A.10)-(A.11), with 
A + 























which are essentially the same conditions as those characterized by (37). Thus, a solution of the labor immobility case
is also a solution of the labor mobility case. The latter result, however, holds when the solution to (37) is interior,
i.e., 
A > 0 and 
B > 0. Additionally, when labor is mobile, the values of 
A and 
B cannot be uniquely determined,
only the aggregate value  = 
A + 
B. This means that even though L
A;L
B; and  are the same in both cases, a
solution in the mobility case is compatible with dierent combinations of 
A and 
B. Nevertheless, at a symmetric
and interior equilibrium, which is the situation analyzed in this paper, the solutions are identical.
It follows from the previous result that when local residents are allowed to choose between productive and illegal
activities, the equilibrium levels of public enforcement chosen by local governments in the cases of labor mobility and
labor immobility should be the same.
2